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ABSTRACT 
Wikipedia is defined by its founders as the “free encyclopedia that anyone 
can edit.” This property, we argue, makes Wikipedia a public good and hence 
subject to under-provision. A puzzling feature of Wikipedia however is its 
enormous size, at roughly seven times that of its commercial counterparts. What 
is driving this growth? And how can we assess the reliability of this giant 
encyclopedia arising solely from free-editing? We model contribution to 
Wikipedia and its reliability. We demonstrate that Wikipedia is indeed subject to 
free-riding, and offer a novel explanation for the mitigation of under-provision 
under such circumstances. We also find that the public-good feature of Wikipedia 
and free-riding introduce a lower-bound in the quality of Wikipedia. This finding 
is consistent with a previous empirical study that established Wikipedia‟s 
surprisingly high level of quality. We identify Wikipedia as part of a general 
Internet phenomenon that we call the Collaborative Net, and that includes 




Wiki, the result of an open-source 
effort, is a relatively new technology that 
allows Net surfers to freely create and edit 
Web page content using any Web browser. It is 
remarkably simple technology, and with its 
text syntax is equally simple to use. In the 
words of the Wiki community:  
“Like many simple concepts, „open 
editing‟ has some profound and subtle 
effects on Wiki usage. Allowing everyday 
users to create and edit any page in a 
Web site is exciting in that it encourages 
democratic use of the Web and promotes 
content composition by nontechnical 
users.” 
Perhaps the most profound, and without 
question the most well-known Wiki project is 
Wikipedia, the “free encyclopedia that anyone 
can edit.” It is available in several languages 
including Shqip and Walon; the English 
version started in 2001 and by December 2008 
had more than 2.5 million articles. Googling 
exotic terms will almost certainly yield links to 
Wikipedia sites, which may be a sign of its 
quality, and is certainly a sign of its popularity. 
Other multilingual free-content projects 




MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
That Wikipedia is offered for free will 
not be surprising to information economists. 
Indeed, information goods are characterized by 
high up-front costs and virtually zero marginal 
costs of production. Since competition will 
drive prices to marginal costs, much of 
information on the Internet will be offered for 
“free,” (or equivalently, sold with zero price 
tags). Even Britannica, the well-respected 
commercial encyclopedia, had to reduce its 
price for its full volume to a fraction of what it 
had charged consumers for years.  
But what is surprising about Wikipedia, 
and other free Wiki efforts is that the high up-
front costs are not as significant. Wikipedia is 
a collaborative effort that anyone can 
contribute to. Wiki as a technology reduces 
publishing costs to virtually zero. A question 
about the reliability of Wikipedia articles then 
immediately follows. Can Net users gather 
information from Wikipedia with a reasonable 
degree of comfort about its reliability?  
Wikipedia has received much criticism 
in the past about the accuracy of its contents 
(CNN.com, 2005). Wikipedia often responded 
by making changes to its design. In December 
2005 for example, Wikipedia considered 
requiring users to register before creating or 
editing articles. Whereas previously, 
Wikipedia users did not require any formal 
registration process to make even the most 
drastic changes to an article. This was in 
response to a complaint in an op-ed published 
in USA Today by a prominent journalist, John 
Seigenthaler, also a former administrative 
assistant to Robert Kennedy. An article in 
Wikipedia had claimed he had been suspected 
in the assassination of the former attorney 
general, and President John F. Kennedy 
(Goodin, 2005). In December 2005, following 
the Seigenthaler controversy, the New York 
Times banned their reporters from using 
Wikipedia as a research tool (Musil 2005). 
And yet increasingly, Wikipedia 
articles are being cited in many other 
traditionally trusted outlets such as newspaper 
columns (c.f. Drost, 2005). A favorite example 
cited by Wikipedia themselves is their use by 
the Parliament of Canada website as a “further 
reading” resource on the topic of same-sex 
marriage. Sreenath Srinivasan, dean and 
professor of Journalism at Columbia 
University first doubted Wikipedia but soon 
was surprised by its apparent reliability. Jimmy 
Wales, Wikipedia‟s founder, intends that 
Wikipedia should achieve a “Britannica or 
better” quality. This may seem almost 
unrealistically ambitious, as “Encyclopaedia 
Britannica” is the oldest English-language 
general encyclopedia, first published in 1768. 
Recent articles in the popular press and media 
however indicated that Wales‟ goal with 
Wikipedia may very well be achievable. 
CNN.com (2005) citing a study by Nature 
(Giles, 2005) claimed that “Wikipedia [was] as 
accurate as Britannica.” They referred to the 
Seigenthaler case, calling it “the exception 
rather than the rule.”  
Wikipedia‟s splendid growth is 
particularly surprising if it is to be assessed 
within a “rational” framework. That Wikipedia 
is free makes it a public good. While 
contributors may get some benefit from it, 
many other users will simply try to free-ride. 
Traditional economic theory suggests that 
Wikipedia as a public good will be subject to 
the tragedy of under-provision. Such under-
CONTRIBUTION 
The primary contribution of this 
paper is its explanation for the paradoxical 
growth of the public good Wikipedia, a free 
encyclopedia that anyone can edit. To our 
knowledge, our explanation is novel and 
contributes to the general literature on 
public goods. The paper also offers 
theoretical explanations for the surprising 
empirical findings on the superior quality of 
the giant encyclopedia arising from free-
editing. This paper should be highly 
interesting to researchers engaged in the 
economic modeling of information systems 
projects, particularly because of the 
uniqueness of Wikipedia and its difference 
from (other) Open Source Systems. It 
should also be of interest to practitioners, 
given the increasing popularity of 
Wikipedia and Wiki technology. 
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provision of public goods is usually mitigated 
through flavors of commercialization such as 
privatization, auctioning, or subsidies. The 
case of Wikipedia is however quite surprising. 
Wikipedia when compared to Britannica, its 
commercial counterpart, is much larger. If one 
measure is the number of articles, Wikipedia 
was already approximately 7 times larger in 
2006 than Britannica which had approximately 
120,000 articles then.  
Wikipedia would not be the first 
information systems project that began as a 
public good but resulted in a quality product. 
Indeed, many successful open-source software 
projects, such as Unix, were created ground-up 
without the offering of any direct pecuniary 
compensation. These products today are often 
cited for their supremacy over related 
commercially-produced products. How is the 
case of Wikipedia then any different? 
To summarize, the main research 
questions we ask in this paper are as follows: 
 How can we explain the surprising 
empirical findings that an encyclopedia 
that anyone can edit is of a high quality? 
 How can we explain the surprisingly large 
size of Wikipedia, when it is a public good 
(created by people and used by people)? 
 How is the case of Wikipedia different 
from Open Source Software development, 
another information systems project that is 
a public good and where neither quality 
nor provision is compromised? 
RELATED LITERATURE 
For our analysis, we invoke the solution 
concept of Nash (1950) equilibrium, since we 
model the contribution to Wikipedia as a non-
cooperative game. To analyze situations 
involving sequential moves, we also consider 
Stackelberg equilibria, which in concept are 
the natural applications of the Nash 
equilibrium solution to dynamic games.  
In addition, the stream of economics 
literature related to the private provision of 
public goods is relevant. Hirshleifer (1983) 
investigated the variation of public good 
provision with three different technologies. We 
use his seminal piece extensively as a basis for 
our modeling. Cornes (1993) develops 
Hirshleifer‟s analysis further, studying the 
effects of changes in income allocation. Varian 
(1994) extends Hirshleifer‟s work by studying 
the effects on equilibria when provision 
involves sequential moves by the agents. The 
results of the literature above do not apply so 
readily to the case of Wikipedia since they all 
predict very high levels of free-riding whereas 
Wikipedia appears to be quite large.  
There have been studies that investigate 
mechanisms in which free-riding is mitigated. 
Andreoni (1990) and Cornes and Sandler 
(1984) investigate the changes in results 
whenever consumers are allowed benefits 
directly from their private contribution in 
addition to the level of the public good. While 
we believe that their work is relevant, we 
investigate how Wiki technology in particular 
is able to mitigate free-riding, perhaps beyond 
the effects of “warm-glow” feelings suggested 
by Andreoni (1990) and Cornes and Sandler 
(1984). 
Free-riding has been studied in a 
variety of IT application contexts. Their 
contexts, however, make their results too 
specific for insights to extend readily over to 
the Wikipedia case. Carlton and Chevalier 
(2003), for example, investigates free-riding 
and sales strategies for the Internet. Varian 
(2004), as another example, studied free-riding 
in the provision of (general) information 
systems reliability. His study has a 
probabilistic flavor, emphasizing the likelihood 
of failure of information systems, and also 
repeats the standard extreme free-riding result.  
Two kinds of equilibria in games of 
incomplete information are considered in our 
paper. First, we consider cheap-talk equilibria 
(cf. Gibbons, 1992) in dynamic games of 
incomplete information when messaging is 
“cheap” or costless, and hence receivers must 
determine the credibility of the messages. 
Second, we briefly talk about signaling 
equilibria (cf. Vega-Redondo, 2003) when 
players try to signal their types using costly 
messaging techniques.  
Wikipedia itself has been the subject in 
a variety of studies. Most notably, Nature‟s 
(Giles, 2005) study involved 42 articles 
reviewed by experts to compare the prestigious 
Mohammad Rahman 
84 
Britannica to the free giant Wikipedia. Their 
results indicated that the average scientific 
entry in Wikipedia contained four errors or 
omissions, while Britannica had three. 
Nonetheless, Wikipedia is planning on test-
launching a reviewing program. Forte and 
Bruckman (2005) investigate why people write 
for Wikipedia even when the encyclopedia 
does not provide bylines to credit authors for 
their hard work by interviewing 22 
Wikipedians. They are however unable to 
derive economic explanations, and instead 
suggest „softer‟ incentives such as engagement 
in desirable activities. Finally, IBM research 
(c.f. Wattenberg et al., 2007) uses 
sophisticated HCI technology to track the 
contribution by Wikipedians, and the growth 
of Wikipedia articles. They find that while 
most articles have been vandalized, “vandalism 
is usually repaired extremely quickly.” 
THE CONTRIBUTION PARADOX OF 
WIKIPEDIA 
We will begin by modeling Wikipedia 
as a public good, and illustrate the standard 
derivation of the free-rider result, and its 
under-provision property. Suppose that there 
are two agents, {1,2}i , and that each can 
choose to contribute a level ix  to Wikipedia. 
This is in very general terms. It may refer to a 
correction of an error, or the authoring of a 
major article. Doing so, each agent i  receives 
a payoff of 
( ) ( )i i i j i iu v x x c x          (1) 
where iv  is monotone concave function 
increasing in the total contribution, and ic  is 
the cost function for that agent, and 
{1,2},   j j i  .  
Since (1) is key to our analysis, we will 
explain its form. First, we are defining 
Wikipedia to be 
i jx x , the total contribution, 
as it is created entirely by Internet users. Every 
individual benefits from having such a website, 
hence the function iv . That function is concave 
to reflect the standard diminishing marginal 
utility assumption. For each individual, the net 
utility depends also on the cost of his own 
contribution.  
It is easy to recognize (1) as the utility 
function of agents in a game involving the 
private provision of a public good. And it is 
easy to envision Wikipedia in the same 
context. Every Internet citizen can potentially 
benefit from having Wikipedia. Contributing to 
Wikipedia however will involve a positive cost 
function. Not surprisingly, we can intuitively 
expect free-riding as a result. That is, more 
people will simply use Wikipedia than 
contribute to it. We shall now derive that 
standard result. 
First, we need to determine the reaction 
functions and Nash equilibria for this 
simultaneous contribution game. A reaction 
function ( )i jf x  gives the optimal strategy of 
agent i  given a choice of 
jx  by agent j , 
{0,1},   j j i  . Let the reaction function of 
agent i  be given by if . We assume that iv and 
ic are twice continuously differentiable for all 
i . The first-order condition is given by  
' '( ) ( )i i j i iv x x c x  . 
If we assume that ic  is linear in ix , 
( )i i i ic x x , where i  is a positive constant, 
and that '
iv  has an inverse, we can define  
' 1ˆ ( )i i ix v 
 . 
If we solve for agent i ‟s contribution 
under the first-order condition, we see that it is 
î jx x . To derive agent i ‟s reaction function 
if , we only need impose a non-negativity 
constraint to get 
ˆ( ) max{ ,0}i j i jf x x x  . 
We can define and account for 
differences in the tastes of the agents in terms 
of ˆix . More formally, we say that agent i  likes 
Wikipedia better if and only if ˆ ˆ
i jx x . This is 
because ˆix  can be defined as agent i ‟s 
standalone contribution: the amount he 
contributes to Wikipedia when the other agent 
does not contribute at all.  
We may plot the reaction functions 1f  
and 2f  of agents 1 and 2 on the same pair of 
axes. This is given in figure 1. The x -axis 
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gives values of 
1x  whereas the y -axis gives 
values of 2x . Any point 
* *
1 2( , )x x  where the two 
response function will intersect will 
correspond to a Nash equilibrium. This is 
because at * *
1 2( , )x x , 
* *
1 2 1( )f x x , and 
* *
2 1 2( )f x x  which satisfies the definition of a 
Nash equilibrium. When only one such point 
exists, the Nash equilibrium is unique. Looking 
at figure 1, the proposition that follows is then 
immediate. 
Paradox 1a: If the contribution to 
Wikipedia is modeled as the standard 
private provision game where the utility 
functions have the form given in (1), there 
exists a unique total size of the 
encyclopedia in equilibrium. A Nash 
equilibrium always exists, and is unique 
when the two agents have different tastes. 
Paradox 1a suggests that Wikipedia 
cannot be expected to grow perpetually, which 
clearly contradicts the continually growing 
characteristic of Wikipedia that can be 
observed. (Between January 2006 and 
December 2008, Wikipedia tripled in size.) 
While it was assumed that the number of 
agents was fixed, shortly we will demonstrate 
how a growth paradox persists even as the 
number of agents increases.  
Suppose, without loss of generality, 
agent 2 likes Wikipedia more than agent 1, that 
is 
2 1
ˆ ˆx x . Then in the unique Nash 
equilibrium, agent 2 provides all of the 
articles, and agent 1 free-rides. If 
2 1
ˆ ˆx x , then 
a plethora of Nash equilibria exist as the 
reaction functions will coincide. But as is clear 
from the figure, the total size will still be 
unique in equilibrium.   
Paradox 1b: In the two-agent provision 
game of Wikipedia where the utility 
functions have the form given in (1), all 
contributions to Wikipedia are made by 
the agent(s) who like it most. All other 
agents free-ride. 
We now contrast that expected outcome 
against the social optimum. The social problem 
will solve 
1 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
,
1 2
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
. .   0, 0
x x
v x x v x x c x c x
s t x x




Figure 1. Equilibria in the standard contribution game
f1(x2) 
f2(x1) 
Sometimes equilibrium w/ sequential 
moves 






Without loss of generality let us 
suppose 1 2  . It is clear then that the social 
optimum is attained when agent 1 contributes 
everything. The first-order condition then 
becomes.  
1 1 2 1
1
1 1
( 0) ( 0)v x v x
x x





which can be written simply as 
' '
1 1 2 1 1( ) ( )v x v x   . 
We note that since 1v  is concave, 
'
1 1( )v x  is decreasing whereas 1  is a constant. 
Since '
2 1( ) 0v x   for all 1x , then the socially 
optimal level of provision, 
1
sx , is  
1 1̂
sx x   , 
where 0  . A special case would involve 
2x̂  . 
This leads us to state formally the 
following: 
Paradox 2: In the two-agent 
contribution game where the utility 
function is of the form in (1), when 
compared to the socially optimal case, 
Wikipedia will always be under-provided. 
Further, the wrong agent may contribute in 
the sense that he may like Wikipedia 
more, but is worse in quality. 
The case of the wrong contributor i  
will occur whenever ˆ ˆ
i jx x , even though 
i j  .  
Our findings thus far are already 
surprising. We expect Wikipedia to be smaller 
in size to the case that is optimally social, as 
Wikipedia can be treated as a public good. 
This under-provision should be lacking or at 
least lessened when financial incentives are 
introduced. Indeed, subsidies and taxes are one 
method of changing equilibria to points that 
are social optima (Landsburg, 2001). So why is 
it then that a purely commercial counterpart, 
Britannica, is much smaller in size than 
Wikipedia, the privately-provided public 
good? At the very least it warrants further 
analysis.  
One modification that can be made is to 
the utility function. In our utility function for 
individual agents given by (1), each agent 
receives utility only from the total level of the 
public good. This may be inconsistent with 
real-life facts. Each agent may receive benefit 
not only from the level of the public good, but 
from his individual contribution as well. 
Wikipedia provides several reasons why one 
may contribute to the public good. Most of 
these are along the lines of positive feelings 
due to good-Samaritan deeds. For instance, 
Wikipedia users are asked to contribute for the 
poor child in Africa having no access to 
expensive encyclopedia. Yet there are also 
other direct benefits associated with 
contributing. Let us consider the evolution of a 
Wikipedian as he contributes to Wikipedia. He 
is increasingly recognized as a reputable 
volunteer, and is elevated to a higher status 
such as that of an „administrator‟ and granted 
distinct privileges.  
The case where agents benefit directly 
from their contribution in addition to the 
overall level of the public good was 
investigated by previous researchers. In 
Andreoni‟s (1990) simple model, an agent‟s 
utility function is a function of both his own 
contribution, and the amount of the public 
good. Andreoni‟s (1990) model is very 
general, in that it captures altruism and its 
antithesis, egoism, as well as “impure 
altruism,” meant to capture concepts such as 
the “warm-glow” felt by agents upon their 
contribution to charities. Andreoni‟s (1990) 
results however pertain to the effects of 
income re-distribution between agents on the 
contribution to charity. Cornes and Sandler‟s 
(1984) result is more relevant. They show that 
when a single act of contribution is able to 
generate utility both directly and indirectly, as 
community size increases, free riding and its 
associated inefficiency may decrease. Their 
model is set up as a standard consumer 
behavior optimization problem.  
An alternative explanation for 
Wikipedia‟s size when compared to Britannica 
is based on the cost structure. Encyclopedia 
fall under a class of goods known as 
information goods. The production of these 
goods is characterized by the necessary 
existence of high up-front (fixed) costs, and 
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virtually zero marginal costs. Britannica‟s 
fixed costs would consist of two major 
components. First, Britannica would need to 
invest in signaling expenses, discussed in 
detail in the next section. Second, Britannica 
would incur costs in authoring articles for 
inclusion in its encyclopedia. Britannica‟s 
profits would depend on the number of 
articles, as the following indicates. Let FC  
stand for fixed cost, 
sC for signaling cost, g  
for a convex cost function increasing in k  the 
number of articles, TC for total cost, TR  for 
total revenue, and let   denote Britannica‟s 
profits. Then  
( )sFC C g k  , 
0TC FC  , 
and 
TR TC   . 









Assuming that it exists, *k then is then 
the unique number of articles selected by 
Britannica for inclusion in its encyclopedia. As 
the above system of equations indicates, this 
*k  depends on TR , which in turn is of course 
determined by the demand and reservation 
values of the consumers.  
A noteworthy point is that Britannica‟s 
choice of *k  will not be socially optimal, and 
it is straightforward to argue this. The socially 
efficient price necessarily equals marginal cost. 
But in Britannica‟s case, we can safely assume 
this to be zero. So any non-zero price will 
involve positive amounts of deadweight loss. 
Of course, there is no solution to this social 
inefficiency problem. Whenever a firm has 
decreasing average costs at the socially 
optimal point, as Britannica does, its profits 
will be negative there. There is no easy way 
however to compare the differences between 
the degrees of suboptimality of the two 
different cases.  
Since Wikipedia use appears to be 
growing, it is of interest how the overall 
efficiency compares to the social optimum as 
the number of agents using it increases. To see 
that, we must analyze the problem in the 
context of an arbitrary number of n  agents. 
We make the simplifying assumption that the 
agents are all identical. In particular, 
iv  and ic  
are all identical 1,...,i n  . First, let us view 
the social optimum as a function of n . As 
stated above, the whole range of equilibria are 
possible since the tastes are identical, and since 
the response functions 
if  will intersect in the 
n -dimensional space at an infinite number of 
points. All such equilibria satisfy the following 






  . 
But one equilibrium may be more 
„intuitive,‟ and somewhat informally Pareto 
optimal. Let us assume that in the Nash 
equilibrium output, all of the agents exert 
identical levels of effort. That is 
* * * *
1 2 ... nx x x x    . 
In the Nash equilibrium now,  
* *ˆ ( 1)x x n x   . 




On the other hand, the social optimum 
output is of course 
ˆnx . 







  . 
Then   is simply the constant 21 n , 
which has derivative 32 n . The following 
proposition then is immediate. 
Paradox 3: When utility functions are 
of the form in (1), and the agents are all 
identical, the relative efficiency of 
Wikipedia decreases rapidly as the 
number of users n  increases, even when 
all the agents are contributing. 
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As mentioned before, Wikipedia by 
nature is very dynamic. Wikipedia grows not 
only as new articles are created, but also as 
extant articles are edited. The game of 
contribution to Wikipedia discussed so far 
however has been static in the sense that all 
moves were simultaneous. It would be 
interesting to investigate the change in the 
equilibrium outcome if agents moved 
sequentially. Varian (1994) investigated the 
general theory of sequential contribution to 
public goods. Our discussion below is based 
on Varian (1994), albeit using a simpler 
version of his elegant model.  
Now the two agents move sequentially, 
so the game of contribution is dynamic. 
Suppose, without loss of generality, agent 1 
moves first. Choosing 1x , he receives a utility 
of 
1 1 1 2 1 1( ) ( )u v x x c x    
when agent 2 subsequently chooses 2x . Using 
the reaction function of 2, we can write the 
right-hand-side equivalently as 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1( ( )) ( )u v x f x c x    
or 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1
ˆ( max{ }) ( )u v x x x c x     
The reaction function can be used to 
split agent 1‟s utility into the following system 
of two equations, 
1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )u x v x c x   if 1 2ˆx x  
1 1 1 2 1 1
ˆ( ) ( ) ( )u x v x c x   if 1 2ˆx x , 
since for any level of contribution 1x  
by agent 1, agent 2 will always contribute 2x  
at least and just enough so that the total  
1 2 2
ˆx x x  . 
Two cases will arise, depending on the 
difference in preferences of the two agents. In 
the first case, 1 2ˆ ˆx x , that is agent 1 likes 
Wikipedia less than agent 2. In that case, agent 
1 will always choose to free-ride on agent 2 
and contribute nothing to Wikipedia. To see 
that, first note agent 1‟s choice between a 
strictly positive contribution, 1 0x  , or free-
riding completely, 
1 0x  . For any choice 
1 0x  , he will receive a net benefit of  
1 2 1
ˆ( ) ( )v x c x , 
as agent 2 will always provide the remainder of 
the positive good. In free-riding completely 
however, agent 1 can receive higher net 
benefits as doing so will cost him nothing. 
That is, free-riding will yield a net benefit of 
1 2
ˆ( )v x . 
The second case is more complicated, 
and more interesting. The first-mover, agent 1, 
likes the good more. That is 
1 2
ˆ ˆx x . As in the 
first case, if agent 1 chooses to free-ride 
completely, he can ensure a net-benefit of at 
least 1 2ˆ( )v x . Although this is less than 1 1̂( )v x , 
agent 1 may still free-ride completely as a 
positive contribution by agent 1 entails costs 
that he will incur, and the net benefit he will 
derive is given by 
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )v x c x . 
If this net benefit 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( )v x c x  is 
greater than 1 2ˆ( )v x , agent 1 will provide all of 
the good himself, whereas if it is smaller, agent 
1 will free-ride entirely. This is quite surprising 
as a result when we recall that agent 1 likes the 
good better. It is interesting to highlight the 
cases when free-riding by agent 1 will occur, 
even when he likes the good better. One case 
may be when tastes are similar. Indeed, if 2x̂  is 
less than 1̂x  but 2x̂  is large enough, then agent 
1 will free-ride. 
The analysis above may explain a 
seemingly strange behavior by the 
administrators of Wikipedia. On Wikipedia‟s 
website, the administrators encourage all users 
to be “bold” and make changes to any of 
Wikipedia‟s articles, even the same article with 
that message itself. Where the stability and 
reliability of the articles is a concern, one 
would perhaps expect some form of mandatory 
registration process, or at least a message of a 
much different tone, such as the following 
perhaps:  
“Please author an article only if you are 
completely sure of its contents. Please do 
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not make changes to an article unless you 
are completely certain of its faults.” 
  Our analysis shows however that 
when moves are sequential, it may be 
advantageous to have the agent who likes the 
good least move first as doing so will result in 
a higher level of contribution. This is because 
the other agent will not have any option of 
free-riding, and will always provide all of the 
good, and hence a „higher‟ level of the good 
will result. When Wikipedia administrators ask 
users to be “bold” and make changes, it may 
act as a signal to the high-level contributors 
that their moves are all that remain. Similarity 
of preferences was mentioned above as one 
case when we will see free-riding by agent 1 
even when he likes the good better. In 
Wikipedia, the similarity in tastes will 
probably feature prominently as the number of 
users is large, and preference may actually be a 
continuous variable.  
We end our discussion related to the 
contribution to Wikipedia by considering the 
case of Open-Source Software (OSS), which is 
another category of “public-good” projects in 
Information Technology that also exhibits the 
paradoxical growth and high-quality. In doing 
so we shall highlight what distinguishes 
Wikipedia from OSS, in order to demonstrate 
both the novelty and the validity of our work. 
Open-Source development projects as 
public-goods are driven in growth by the 
seemingly altruistic efforts of a variety of 
individuals. As with Wikipedia, of wonder has 
been the effect of voluntary provision on both 
the quality and amounts of such open-source 
efforts (cf. Lerner and Tirole, 2000). And as 
with Wikipedia, open-source projects are 
surprisingly impressive in quality, and found in 
abundance. A considerable amount of research 
has been conducted to investigate this apparent 
contradiction to the traditional findings related 
to the private provision of public goods. The 
theoretical explanation that seems most 
feasible (Lerner and Tirole, 2002) is that 
participation in open-source projects allows 
developers to effectively signal their skills to 
ensure higher levels of future returns. One may 
be tempted to suggest that contribution to 
Wikipedia may be explained away in a similar 
manner, that individuals are editing articles to 
signal their higher “quality.” We contend 
however that such contributions to Wikipedia 
cannot constitute a signaling activity, and 
provide an intuitive explanation. Users cannot 
effectively signal their “quality” because 
reward structures based on such signals cannot 
be justified. Simply put, if better articles were 
rewarded for, then agents could easily acquire 
the information at nominal costs from other 
sources, such as Britannica, and the bases for 
rewards would be unfounded.  
An Explanation for Wikipedia’s Size 
So far, we have been able to reproduce 
only the extreme free-riding result that is 
standard in the public goods economics 
literature. Clearly though, the abstraction in the 
model is far too rigid to be true in practice. 
Instead of extreme free-riding, what we can 
readily observe in Wikipedia is a variety of 
contribution levels. The empirical study by 
Nature (Giles, 2005) suggests that there is 
some free-riding with only about 10% of the 
scientists it surveyed contributing to articles. 
Most articles seem to be the result of generally 
cooperative effort with partial contributions 
from a large number of users. Some 
contributors seem to be highly excited by their 
topics of interest while being indifferent to 
other topics. Finally, some articles seem to be 
reactive to others and quite large, such as the 
article on the late scientist Lisa Meitner who 
was failed to be recognized for her work in 
collaboration with the Nobel laureate Otto 
Hahn.  
In this section, we modify our model 
and offer an explanation for Wikipedia‟s size. 
We introduce a new property of agents known 
as “type.” Suppose agent i  has type 0it  . In 
contributing ix  the agent receives a payoff of 
2( (1 ( ) )) ( )i i i j i j i iu v x x t t c x        (2) 
where iv  is again a monotone concave 
function, and i i ic x  is the cost function for 
that agent. The payoff model above is 
straightforward and intuitive. From the other 
agent‟s contribution, an agent receives utility 
that is moderated by the degree of similarity 
between the two agents. For example, an 
economist may care little about a psychology 
article, and at the very extreme, a liberal may 
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actually receive disutility from the presence of 
a conservative‟s article on say abortion. The 
first-order condition is given by 
' 2( (1 ( ) ))i i j i j iv x x t t      
Once again, we can define ˆix  as 
' 1ˆ ( )i i ix v 
  
assuming linear costs and the existence of the 
inverse of '
iv . Now suppose agent j  
contributes ˆ
ix . Some algebra shows that agent 
i „s best response is to provide 
2ˆ ( ) 0i i jx t t   
whenever 
i jt t , and quite surprisingly,  
2ˆ ˆ( )i i j ix t t x   
whenever 2( ) 1i jt t  . So even though agent 
j  is contributing the entire amount that agent 
i  would have contributed himself, agent i  
cannot simply free-ride as agent j ‟s 
preferences are different. The results are more 
clear if we plot the response functions ( )i jf x . 
This is given in Figure 2.  
We can state the most important result: 
Proposition 1a:  In the two-agent 
contribution game with the utility function 
of the agents having the form given in (2), 
as the difference between the preferences 
of the agents 2( )i jt t  increases, the free-
rider problem of Wikipedia as a public 
good is mitigated. 
From the figure, we see that the exact 
Nash equilibrium outcome will depend on the 
magnitude of 2( )i jt t . The dashed lines are 
the different response functions of the two 
agents with different values of 2( )i jt t . The 
points of intersection highlighted as Nash 
equilibria correspond to pairs of response 
functions with the same values of 2( )i jt t . 
When 2( )i jt t  is small enough, then complete 
free-riding will result, as long as one agent 
prefers Wikipedia more than the other. At an 
intermediate level of 2( )i jt t , the two agents 
offer their standalone contributions. Now even 
though agent 1 is offering his original 
contribution, agent 2 is not free riding 
 
 







1 2( ) 1t t   
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anymore. Finally, if 2( )i jt t  is very large, 
then the Nash equilibrium is the outermost 
point, where both agents are reactively 
contributing very large amounts. We state that 
more formally below. 
Proposition 1b: Suppose, without 
loss of generality, ˆ ˆ
j ix x , and that 
îx  , four regions of 
2( )i jt t  can be 













   , agent i will 
free-ride entirely on agent j  as in 
equilibrium 0ix  . In addition, 
ˆ












   , agent i  will 
free-ride partially on agent j  as in 
equilibrium ˆ0 i ix x  . 
 If 2( ) 1i jt t  , then agent i  will not 
free-ride at all, being indifferent to 
agent j „s contribution. The outcome is 
ˆ ˆ( , )i jx x  which can often be socially 
efficient. 
 If 2( ) 1i jt t  , then both agents 
contribute at levels that are high, but 
which can often be socially inefficient.  
Proof: {Sketch} To derive region 1, first from 
figure 2 it is clear that agent i  will stop free 
riding as soon as ˆ( ) 0i jf x  . We note that 
ˆ( ) 0i jf x   is given by 
2ˆ ˆ (1 ( ) ).i i j i jx x x t t     
In that case, a little algebra can show 
that the condition on 
2( )i jt t  is that it should 








. Deriving the rest of the 
regions is straightforward, and we omit it.  
We can demonstrate the meaning of the 
ranges by means of an example. Suppose we 
have two contributors, where one agent likes 
Wikipedia more. Suppose the article to be 
created is to profile a prominent conservative 
politician. If our two agents are both 
supporters of the politician, and so 2( )i jt t  is 
fairly small and in region 1, then the agent who 
likes Wikipedia more will author the article 
entirely. Suppose instead that one agent likes 
the politician‟s stance on opposing outsourcing 
labor, whereas the other agent likes his stance 
on the environment. Then 2( )i jt t  is in region 
2, and agent 1 will not contribute everything. 
This is probably most reflective of Wikipedia‟s 
editing scenario, where free-editing allows 
individuals to contribute what they value most 
in the form of small edits. Suppose one agent 
supports the politician as a union member 
strongly opposed to outsourcing, whereas the 
other agent supports him as an environmental 
activist. Then 2( )i jt t  is in region 3, and each 
agent will write their version of the article 
being indifferent to each other‟s contribution. 
Finally, if one agent is liberal, then 2( )i jt t  is 
in region 4, and we may expect two different 
articles, one with a liberal focus and another 
with a conservative focus.  
RELIABILITY OF WIKIPEDIA 
In this section, we extend our model of 
the contribution game to account for reliability. 
In a general setting involving n  potential 
contributors, let the contribution by agent i  be 
described by 0iq  , where iq  is the quality of 
that contribution. The quality of Wikipedia 
then is a function of 1 2, ,..., nq q q . One 
particular function that is well suited as a 
definition of quality for Wikipedia is the 













Although this definition may appear 
somewhat arbitrary, or even strange as a 
choice, it is well suited as it captures the idea 
that “weaker-links” are more significant. 
Weaker-links in the context of public goods 
have been studied by Cornes (1993), albeit 
within the setting of a general model. A closely 
related concept is that of the Cobb-Douglas 
function in the context of public goods (cf. 
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Varian, 1984). It is clear that this definition 
captures the essence of “weaker-links” when 








Clearly, the marginal effects on total 
reliability Q  are higher whenever iq  is lower. 
In terms of the reliability of Wikipedia, 
“weaker-links” will determine whether or not 
Wikipedia can be trusted in general as a 
source. If it is known a priori only that a few 
articles are inaccurate, without knowing which 
ones exactly, then potentially all articles 
should be approached with caution, or at least 
verified using other sources. To simplify our 
analysis, we may consider the special case of 
“weaker-links,” which is the case when 
reliability is determined by the “weakest-link.” 
In that case, if it is known a priori only that a 
single article is inaccurate, without knowing 
exactly which one, then without verification 
potentially any article may be the inaccurate 
one and the reliability of the entire project is in 
question. 
We may model the weakest-link 
concept by redefining quality as 
1min{ ,..., }nQ q q       (3) 
To solve for the equilibrium 
contribution qualities, we first need to derive 
the reaction functions. Suppose 
iv  and ic  are 
functions as before but accepting 
iq  as the 
input parameter instead. Also let 2n  . Agent 
i  will receive the following in net benefit by 
contributing iq : 
(min{ , }) ( )i i i j i iu v q q c q   
Let us capture differences in tastes by 
the constants 1̂q  and 2q̂ , which are the 
maximum levels of qualities that agent 1 and 
agent 2 would care for Wikipedia to have 
respectively. It is then straightforward to show 
that for agent i , it is optimal to match the 
other agent‟s contribution if it is less than 1̂q or 
provide 1̂q  otherwise. So the reaction 
functions are given by 
ˆ( ) min{ , }i j j if q q q  
 
 





A Nash equilibrium w/ simultaneous moves.   
Always unique equilibrium w/ sequential moves 
q1 
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Without loss of generality suppose 
1 2
ˆ ˆq q . 
Plotting the reaction functions in figure 3, we 
can clearly see that there exists a plethora of 
Nash equilibria. We may select the one that 
Pareto dominates the other as it may perhaps 
be the most likely outcome. In that Nash 
equilibrium the reliability of Wikipedia is 
given by 1 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆmin{ , }q q q .  
An interesting extension of the result 
above is that uniqueness of Nash equilibria can 
easily be established if moves are assumed to 
be sequential and hence the game dynamic. 
The uniqueness result for the general model 
was argued by Hirshleifer (1983) and 
established by Varian (2004). The argument 
for uniqueness is as follows. Let agent 1, 
without loss of generality have the first move. 
Agent 1 will choose 1 2ˆ ˆmin{ , }q q . Choosing 
any amount larger will result in forgone 
benefits and useless costs when the subsequent 
choice will be less. Choosing any amount 
smaller is not the best option.  
Proposition 2a: When reliability 
of Wikipedia is defined as in (3) in the 
sequential two-agent game, the unique 
equilibrium level of reliability of 
Wikipedia is the least of the minimum 
levels desired by contributors. 
This result above appears „mixed,‟ in 
that its optimality is not clear. At first glance, it 
is reassuring to realize that the equilibrium 
reliability will most likely be at least above a 
bare minimum threshold. But two questions 
arise subsequently. How does this compare 
with the reliability that is socially optimal? 
And is such a threshold level of reliability 
„good-enough,‟ per se? 
To determine Wikipedia‟s equilibrium 
reliability to the socially optimal case, we note 
that the social objective is to maximize the 
following social utility function, by choosing 
1q  and 2q  accordingly. 
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2(min{ , }) (min{ , }) ( ) ( )sU v q q v q q c q c q     
In the social optimum, level, all agents 
need to be contributing articles of the same 
quality. This is easy to argue using 
contradiction. Suppose that 1 2q q . Without 
loss of generality, let 1 2q q . If 1 sq q , the 
socially optimal quality level, then reliability 
will be compromised. If on the other hand 
1 sq q  even though reliability is at the 
socially optimum level, social welfare can still 
be improved since 
2 (.)c  is increasing in q  and 
agent 2 can increase his private benefits by 
compromising the quality of his contribution. 
So the socially optimal point is the single level 





sq  is hard to solve, we can 
still draw insights from analyzing various 
cases. Suppose the choice of sq is between 1̂q  
and 2q̂  where 1̂q  < 2q̂ . It is already clear that 
either one may be more optimal in equilibrium, 
depending on iv  and ic . To allow for further 
analysis, let us simplify the matter and make 
all iv „s identical, and as before ic „s linear 
functions. Since the Nash equilibrium outcome 
is expected to be a choice of 1̂q , let us first 
consider otherwise. In choosing 2q̂ , agent one 
will need to make a suboptimal choice that will 
decrease his net utility by  
1 2 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )v q v q q    
where 2 1ˆ ˆq q q   . On the other hand, agent 
2‟s loss from agent 1 selecting 1̂q  is given by 
2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )v q v q q    
We see that agent 2 will choose 1̂q in 
the socially optimal case whenever 
2 1
1 2







The above analysis leads us to state the 
following proposition without proof. 
Proposition 2b:  The reliability of 
Wikipedia, when defined by (3) in the 
two-agent game, will be compromised 
when compared to the socially optimal 
case if quality preferences are close 
enough. If quality preferences are far 
apart, then Wikipedia will have the 
socially optimal quality level. 
Of course, in the analysis thus far, we 
assumed that no individual would be interested 
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in deliberately destroying the reliability of 
Wikipedia. That is, we considered only 
situations when individuals make the choice 
solely between benevolent contributions or 
free-riding. Wikipedia however is subject to 
“vandalism” in that perfect articles can be 
edited arbitrarily by individuals interested in 
deliberately undermining Wikipedia‟s 
reliability. To incorporate vandalism into the 
model, one needs only to introduce agents with 
the appropriate structure of the utility function. 
At this point, we suggest no normative 
guidelines for mitigating this problem. Instead, 
we highlight that self-regulation will be 
possible insofar as there are agents who endure 
significant disutility from vandalism actions. 
At the very least, these agents can always 
change an article back to its original state. 
Obviously, at any point in time an article may 
be the subject of vandalism, and that fact may 
not be clear to the casual user. It may be 
worthwhile for users to check the time-stamped 
history of the article to determine whether they 
can reliably use it for references.  
We can still model the concept of 
vandalism and demonstrate equilibrium 
outputs as follows. Suppose there are two 
agents, a vandal and one other who is a 
benefactor whom we call the contributor.  





v c d if d x
u







when he contributes an amount d  of damage 
to Wikipedia, while x  is the positive 
contribution of the benefactor.   
In that function v  is the benefit the 
vandal derives whenever the reliability of 
Wikipedia is compromised, and c  is the cost 
function increasing in d . Suppose the 
contributor has the following utility function 
( )
c
v x x if x d
u







where v  is again increasing monotone, 
concave in x , and 0   is a cost constant.  
We now need to derive the response 
functions. We start with the response function 
vf  of the vandal, as that is easier. For each 
value of x , the vandal needs to choose 
between a positive contribution 0d   or 
abstaining from vandalism. A positive 
contribution will be better if and only if 
v cd   and d x . The optimal positive 
contribution *d  will be infinitesimally larger 
than x . To derive the full response function 
cf  of the contributor, we note that the choice 
is between a positive contribution 0x   and 
no contribution. For 0x  , there is always a 
unique positive *x  that solves 
max ( )
x
v x cx  
So the choice is between *x and 0x  . 
The condition for reliability to be maintained 
in equilibrium is of course that * vx
c
   . This 
leads us to state the following. 
Proposition 2c:  In the two-agent 
(a vandal and a contributor) game of 
Wikipedia where the utility functions are 
of the form in (4) and (5) articles in 
equilibrium will not sway back and forth 
between vandals and contributors. To 
prevent vandalism of an article in the 
unique equilibrium outcome, the least 
quality preference among those of the 
editors should be at least equal to the 
benefit derived from vandalism. 
Although never due to vandalism, there 
is one situation when articles may sway back 
and forth through editing. When readers are 
unsure of the contents of an article, and have 
no way of verifying their accuracy, the article 
may be subject to repeated editing by polarised 
editors. The situation may be exacerbated by 
the fact that editing is not a „costly‟ activity. 
Consequently, we may use the solution concept 
of cheap-talk equilibria (cf. Gibbons, 1992) 
that investigate credibility in environments 
sustaining costless messaging. 
Suppose chance draws an editor‟s type 
to be either a „lying‟ or „honest‟ individual. 
The editor behaves according to his type and 
edits an article. The users of Wikipedia then 
have the option of believing or disbelieving the 
contents of the article, but have no idea about 
the true type of the editor. Whether believing 
An Analysis of Wikipedia 
Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application (JITTA), 9:3, 2008.   95 
or disbelieving occurs in equilibrium will 
depend on the fulfilment of three conditions, 
and eventually on the payoffs to the editor and 
users. The first condition is that the users‟ 
preferred actions will need to depend on the 
type of the editor. This condition is trivially 
fulfilled; users will prefer to believe honest 
editors and disbelieve others. The second 
condition is that editors must have different 
preferences across the users‟ strategies. This 
condition fails to be fulfilled. Both types of 
editors would like users to believe them. 
Although the third condition does not need to 
be stated, we do so anyway for the sake of 
completeness. That condition requires that the 
editors‟ and users‟ preferences not be 
completely opposed. This condition is also not 
fulfilled with Wikipedia. Specifically, users 
prefer to believe when editors are honest and 
disbelieve otherwise. But lying editors prefer 
that users believe, and hence communication 
cannot occur.  
That many Wikipedia articles cannot or 
will not be believed by users is not a result that 
is destructive to the value of the project. 
Rather, we contend that it is a major strength. 
In particular, the polarization result of free-
editing in Wikipedia will act as a perfect 
signalling device to users for highlighting 
situations when they should disbelieve articles 
that may be highly opinionated and less 
factual. This is one explanation for the 
common saying about Wikipedia that even 
amidst discourse and vandalism, the actual 
discourse itself may be informative. This 
communication feature of Wikipedia may be a 
great strength in the face of its commercial 
counterparts, such as Britannica. First, users of 
Britannica may not be able to discern 
opinionated articles that are further from truth 
from those that are more factually correct. 
Further, these articles will often be believed 
because the three conditions of cheap-talk 
equilibria highlighted above may often be 
fulfilled even after critique by a review 
committee.  
In terms of the design mechanism, we 
may be interested in seeing what the effect will 
be of punishing vandals. Suppose, for example, 
that vandals‟ IP addresses are logged and then 
future activities blocked.  
THE COLLABORATIVE NET 
Today, a striking Internet phenomenon 
can easily be spotted. We call this 
phenomenon the “Collaborative Net,” and it is 
a culmination of an information pool created 
mostly by most of its users. The simplest 
technological introductions are enabling this 
phenomenon, which in turn is drastically 
redefining properties of the Internet. In 
addition to wiki, blogs are such a technological 
innovation and the blogosphere is a 
Collaborative Net feature.  
One direct consequence of the dynamic 
blogosphere is a concept known as “citizen 
journalism.” Other terms used to describe the 
same concept include “grassroots reporting,” 
or “media-of-the-masses.” Citizen journalism 
as a topic has been investigated in journalism 
studies (cf. Andrews, 2003; Blood, 2003; 
Regan, 2004). Lasica (2003) for example 
defines it as “individuals playing an active role 
in the process of collecting, reporting, sorting, 
analysing and disseminating news and 
information, a task once reserved almost 
exclusively to the news media,” and contends 
that the transparency of blogging has 
contributed to increase the accessibility of 
news entities. While traditional periodic 
sources of information involved professional 
activities, such as television news programs or 
magazines and other periodicals, citizen 
journalism is providing Internet surfers 
alternative sources. Features remarkable about 
citizen journalism are its vast size and its 
provision by ordinary citizens. These features 
become strikingly apparent particularly when 
citizen journalism is compared to the 
mainstream media industry, as the latter can be 
characterized by its composition of a limited 
set of players. Of concern is the credibility of 
the information reported through citizen 
journalism channels; is the information 
provided through citizen journalism reliable? 
In contrast, many mainstream media players 
have well-established reputations, with famous 
journalists possessing enviable credentials. An 
understanding of the credibility of information 
reported becomes even more important with 
new practices by Internet news aggregators. In 
a recent article titled “Can You Tell Blogs 
From „Real‟ News?” in Forbes, Dicarlo (2005) 
observes that blogs and other user-generated 
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content will soon show up on Yahoo!, blurring 
the lines between professional media and 
citizen journalism.  
The results established in this paper 
have implications for the Collaborative Net 
feature of citizen journalism. By means of our 
main result, we have established that when 
preferences are sufficiently different, the 
underprovision problem of public goods 
resulting is mitigated as extreme free-riding is 
no longer feasible. This result, and our analysis 
in general will extend over easily to citizen 
journalism. The popularity of citizen 
journalism comprising blogs is often attributed 
to the failure of traditional media outlets to 
cover a wide enough variety of articles. In 
2005 for example, bloggers championed the 
case of a missing woman which did not receive 
national media attention as that of Laci 
Peterson. According to the bloggers, the 
missing woman was poor and African 
American, and deemed unworthy of media 
attention unlike the attractive Peterson 
(Farivar, 2005). Our analysis showed that 
traditional print media (such as Britannica) 
will be unable to cover all of these articles. 
Citizen journalism however may not be as 
accurate as Wikipedia when readers will have 
no way to verify the content. We have already 
mentioned that in games of incomplete 
information, under three conditions cheap-talk 
equilibria are possible when information 
cannot be verified. Further, unlike Wikipedia, 
the publisher of a blog has full control over the 
contents of an article. Consequently, highly 
opinionated articles can easily prevail. An 
example of this was the appearance of 
numerous faceless blogs that successfully 
defended G. W. Bush during the 2004 
elections when his service record was in 
question. 
DISCUSSION 
Wikipedia is attracting both crowds and 
criticism. Users are drawn to Wikipedia not 
only by its tempting free-offering, but also 
because it contains articles on almost every 
conceivable topic. Why is Wikipedia so large, 
even as a public good? And can we trust 
articles that “anyone can edit?” 
The first characteristic of Wikipedia we 
investigated was its sheer size. Since 
Wikipedia can be considered a public-good, 
we demonstrated how traditional theory would 
suggest that the standard free-rider problem 
would emerge. In equilibrium, only a few 
volunteers would contribute. But this result 
would obviously contradict the empirical 
observation that Wikipedia is roughly seven 
times as large as its commercial counterpart. 
Consequently, we investigated mechanisms in 
which extreme free-riding was being mitigated. 
Our main result in this paper was an 
explanation for the size of Wikipedia based on 
equilibrium contributions depending on the 
differences in types. Free-editing allows for a 
variety of expressions; expressions that reflect 
differences in type. In addition, using well-
grounded principles from information 
economics, we explained why Wikipedia‟s 
commercial counterpart could be much smaller 
in size.  
The second characteristic of the 
Wikipedia we investigated was its reliability. 
This characteristic is currently a topic of much 
debate. Indeed, while many critics of 
Wikipedia are highly skeptical about the 
reliability of this free-encyclopedia that anyone 
can edit, surprising results are emerging 
regarding Wikipedia‟s reliability. Our results 
were important as we are able to establish both 
lower and upper bounds for the reliability of 
Wikipedia. Qualitatively, Wikipedia‟s 
definition as a public good, combined with 
free-riding and free-editing helps to maintain 
the reliability of Wikipedia.  
We identified Wikipedia as part of a 
general Internet phenomenon that we call the 
Collaborative Net. The effect that the simple 
technologies enabling the Collaborative Net 
inspires awe. Increasingly, users are adopting 
more active roles. Previously, Net users were 
frequently called “browsers.” And they were 
exactly that, being unable to edit most of the 
information online. Today, more and more Net 
users are actually the contributors to a vast 
pool of information as bloggers or contributors 
to Wiki projects. This pool of information is 
characteristically dynamic with changes being 
made to it constantly.  
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The primary contribution of this paper 
is its novel explanation for the paradoxical 
growth of Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 
that anyone can edit. To our knowledge, our 
explanation is novel and contributes to the 
general literature on public goods. The paper 
also offers theoretical explanations for the 
surprising empirical findings on the superior 
quality of the giant encyclopedia arising from 
free-editing. Our findings have implications for 
the much-debated topic of credibility in the 
new Collaborative Net environment.  We also 
highlight the uniqueness of Wikipedia when 
compared to (other) Open Source Systems.  
Our study features prominently as we 
are able to assess contribution and reliability 
within the traditional economic paradigm, in 
contrast to other studies. Benkler (2006) for 
example examines the contribution to blogs 
and wiki projects from a social-capital 
perspective. In additional to its theoretical 
appeal, our study is also of practical relevance 
as wiki projects will feature as options 
alternative to traditional knowledge pool-
models. Knowledge-management, for example, 
can be implemented in organizations very 
efficiently by the use of information systems 
that are designed similar to Wikipedia.  
The main limitation of our study was 
the use of two-person games to model 
contributions to Wikipedia when in reality 
Wikipedia involves the contributions of 
thousands of individuals. We believe however 
that the insights generated are still valid for at 
least three reasons. First, our aim was not to 
derive accurate numerical results, but instead 
to gain an understanding of the behavior. We 
are convinced that two-person games are 
sufficient for that purpose, particularly since 
they are the standard in studying provisions to 
public goods (c.f. Varian, 1994). Second, in 
many cases richer games are a collection of 
smaller games, and in Wikipedia, the 
contribution game will often be reduced to the 
final two individuals who like it most. Third, 
mathematically, many of our results will still 
hold when considering n -dimensional vectors.  
While Wikipedia offers many areas of 
future research such as the social and legal 
aspects of a free-to-edit information source, we 
would particularly suggest studying the 
specific design features of wiki-based 
information systems. One may investigate, for 
instance, incentives to remain neutral with 
varying levels of policing. Such studies would 
further highlight the suitability of Wikipedia 
and other wiki-based projects as reliable, 
unbiased information systems for use in 
effective knowledge-management. This area is 
particularly promising as commercial 
applications of wiki technology are emerging. 
Many online retailers including Amazon.com 
are implementing wiki-based review systems, 
and ShopWiki.com is an entire online business 
based on user-generated reviews published 
using wiki. A blogger recently reported that he 
was offered a contract by a Microsoft PR 
associate to edit a Wikipedia article the 
associate felt was biased against Microsoft 
technology (Jelliffe, 2007). While the associate 
maintained that it was only intended to be 
compensation for using a neutral voice, several 
interesting questions arise that relate to 
conflicts of interest, and the effects of 
pecuniary compensation on the overall 
neutrality of wiki articles.  
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